Inside Sean Payton’s Fourth-Down Decision in the Broncos-Patriots AFC Championship.

During the lead-up to the AFC Championship Game, Sean Payton sat in his Denver Broncos office reviewing film of the New England Patriots. Hoping to keep an eye on the Divisional Round matchup between the Los Angeles Rams and the Chicago Bears, he turned on another screen—but inadvertently landed on Nickelodeon’s Dora the Explorer before finally finding the correct channel. Just in time, he caught a critical Bears fourth-down situation: fourth-and-2 from the Rams’ 21-yard line. The Bears chose to attempt the conversion instead of kicking a routine field goal. Payton immediately reacted. “Kick it,” he muttered, as Chicago’s quarterback Caleb Williams was intercepted, ultimately costing the Bears three points—the margin that decided the game. Decisions on fourth down have become some of the most scrutinized choices in modern football. Traditionally, coaches opted to take points on short fourth downs. That began changing in 2002, when economist David Romer published “It’s Fourth Down and What Does the Bellman Equation Say?” Using a Bellman Equation model, Romer concluded that the expected value of attempting fourth-and-short conversions often exceeded the value of kicking or punting. While the findings did not immediately alter coaching practices, analytics gradually encouraged more aggressive decision-making, with some coaches like Detroit’s Dan Campbell embracing fourth-down attempts as part of their identity. Payton relies heavily on Evan Rothstein, Denver’s director of game management and assistant offensive line coach. Rothstein, who learned under Bill Belichick in New England, delivers detailed Saturday morning presentations that analyze the prior week’s critical plays and provide data-backed recommendations for similar situations. Yet, the final call rests with Payton himself.

“I wanted 14-0,” Payton said about Denver’s decision on fourth-and-1 in the second quarter against the Patriots. With Jarrett Stidham starting in place of the injured Bo Nix, Denver’s offense had struggled in the red zone, and its defense had been inconsistent against top opponents since the bye week. Facing fourth-and-1 at the New England 14-yard line, Payton initially dialed up a running play called Nickel Duo from 11 personnel—one running back, one tight end, and three receivers—but he called a timeout to reconsider. Ultimately, he switched to a passing play, a bootleg to the right, but the Patriots countered with a Red 2 zone behind a six-man front. Stidham’s throw fell incomplete, leaving the Broncos without points and without another close scoring opportunity for the remainder of the game. Payton later admitted, “I wish I’d stayed with the initial play call.” The Broncos’ loss stemmed from multiple factors: missed field goals, a fumble, Stidham’s interception, and a defense unable to force turnovers against New England’s Drake Maye. Yet the failed fourth-down attempt symbolized the thin line between strategic brilliance and miscalculation in high-stakes football.

Payton, a 62-year-old coach with nearly two decades of head-coaching experience and a Super Bowl title, reflected quietly after the game. “I can’t believe we lost,” he said, pausing before adding, “That fourth down …” For Payton, and for football itself, the unpredictability of fourth down is both a source of frustration and the essence of the game.